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THE USE OF FORCE IN EFFECTING OR RESISTING ARREST*
Roy Moreland" *
One of the most difficult and perplexing problems in the law of
criminal procedure is the amount of force that may be used in effect-
ing an arrest and, conversely, the amount that may be used in resist-
ing one. Perhaps this is due, in part, to the many phases and ramifica-
tions of the problem. Situations having to do with both felonies and
misdemeanors and with arrest both with and without warrant are in-
cluded in the problem and, in the case of each, whether the arrester
can ever go so far to effectuate his purpose of bringing the party into
submission as to take his life, if nothing short of that will accomplish
the purpose of the arrest.
In the case of the arrestee the problem involves, among other
things, a differentiation of rule based upon whether the arrest is legal
or illegal. In the case of both the arrester and the arrestee a number
of other factors affect the decision in particular cases, such as, for
example, whether the defect is patent or latent when the arrest is
under a defective warrant. Finally, there, are a number of funda-
mentally separate questions, such as the right to self-defense, which
often become involved in, and a part of, the general problem of
force in effecting or resisting arrest.
It thus becomes immediately apparent that one of the major prob-
lems in a discussion of the amount of force that may be used in
effecting or resisting arrest is that of breaking down the problem so
that its various factors may be discussed with some particularity and
clarity. With that in mind, it is proposed to begin the discussion with
an examination of the situation where the force is exercised by an
officer or private person in making an arrest for a major, atrocious
felony.
A. Use of Force in Effecting Arrest.
1. Where the Arrestee Has Committed, Is Committing, or Is About To Commit
a Major, Atrocious Felony.
An arrester can use the force requisite to effect an arrest. This
general statement is broadly true but apt to be misleading. Of course,
the arrester may meet force with force, but that simple torts state-
ment will, in most cases, not consummate an arrest-it will result in a
stalemate.. The arrester, if the arrestee resists, must necessarily do
more than meet force with equal force, he must meet force with
suffcient more force to cause the arrestee to yield. But, suppose the
situation becomes such in a particular case that the force requisite
to effect the arrest would necessitate the taking of the life of the
• This article is a chapter of a forthcoming book.
•* Professor of Law, College of Law, University of Kentucky.
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arrestee. May the arrester go that far? The answer is "Yes" in the
case of major or atrocious felonies where the arrester sees the act
or it was committed in fact by the arrestee; it is "No," according to the
better view, in the case of all other offenses.
The rule that an officer or a private person may do all that is
reasonably necessary to affect an arrest for an atrocious felony even
to the taking of the life of the arrestee' is of ancient origin. Originally,
it was based upon the theory that such a one had forfeited his life
to the community for all felonies were punishable with death at the
time.2 The rationalization today is more difficult. Fundamentally, it
is based upon the belief that such a person should not escape trial
for his crime. Further, there is the additional factor that in many
such cases the arrestee-who is facing a severe penalty if taken-is a
vicious person at heart and potentially dangerous to the peace and
safety of the community so long as he remains at large. He cannot
be shot on sight, his execution is the function of the proper state
official after, and if, he is given the death penalty on trial but it is im-
perative that his arrest be effected and the arrester is given the
authority to use all means necessary to achieve that goal even
to the taking of his life, if it appears reasonably certain that he can-
not be taken otherwise.
Does the rule that an officer can kill if it appears reasonably neces-
sary to do so to effect an arrest for an atrocious felony extend to those
cases where the officer does not see the felony committed but is never-
theless able to make a valid arrest without a warrant upon reasonable
belief? It does not; in such cases the officer kills the arrestee at his
peril. If it turns out that an atrocious felony was not committed in
fact or that if one was committed the arrestee did not commit it, he
is not protected. This is a natural result of a rational interpretation
of the rule as to the amount of force that may be used by the officer
in making an arrest. He may use reasonable force. When he sees an
atrocious felony committed, the law considers that the force used is
no more than reasonable if he find its necessary to go so far as to
kill the arrestee if that appears reasonably necessary to prevent the
escape of the arrestee. But, by the weight of authority,3 the law balks
IStorey v. State, 71' Ala. 329 (1892). See Greenleaf on Evidence (15th ed.,
1892) sec. 115. For the rule as to private persons, see Perkins, The Law of
Arrest, 25 Ia. L. Rev. 201, 274-276 (1940); A.L.I. Rest. Torts (1934) sec. 131.
Since at common law all felonies were punishable by death, every felony was
considered to be atrocious. There were no minor felonies at the time. Today
the rule undoubtedly continues as to all atrocious felonies-the only question
is whether it has softened as to non-atrocious, non-violent, minor, statutory
felonies. This problem is discussed in the text at page 412.
-Petrie v. Cartwright, 114 Ky. 103, 109, 70 S.W. 297, 299 (1902).
A note in the Kentucky Law Journal states that there are three views
as to the liability of a police officer for killing a person whom he reasonably
believes to have committed a felony where no felony has been committed in
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-and wisely-at taking the additional step of considering it reason-
able to kill one who is only reasonably believed to have committed
an atrocious felony. It is reasonable to arrest him under such cir-
cumstances but unreasonable to kill him although it reasonably ap-
pears necessary to do so to complete the arrest.
A leading decision on the point is the Kentucky case of Petrie v.
Cartwright.4 In that case Petrie hit one of two men who earlier in
the evening had made indecent remarks to his wife. The force of the
blow caused the man to fall. At that instant someone called out to
Petrie to run, which he did. The city marshal was standing a few
yards distant but it was dark and neither he nor Petrie recognized
the other. Seeing the man fall and his apparent assailant running
away, he called on Petrie to halt. Petrie did not do so and the officer
fired one bullet into the ground and then, taking aim, he fired a
second time, killing Petrie. Mrs. Petrie brought a civil action under
the Kentucky wrongful death statute and the officer contended that
he was acting in his official capacity and reasonably believing that
Petrie had committed a felony, he had shot him to prevent his escape.
The court instructed the jury that, if the officer believed in good
faith, and had reasonable grounds to believe, that Petrie had com-
mitted a felony and, after using all other available means to arrest
him, fired the fatal shot solely to procure his arrest, and in doing
so used no more force than appeared reasonably necessary in order
to make the arrest, they should find for the defendant. The jury
found for the defendant but the appellate court reversed the decision
-for error in the instructions. The court first stated that Petrie had
committed no felony and then went on to say:
We have been unable to find any common law authority justifying an
officer in killing a person sought to be arrested, who fled from him, where
the officer acted upon suspicion, and no felony had in fact been com-
mitted. The common law rule allowing an officer to kill a felon in order
to arrest him rests upon the idea that felons ought not to be at large, and
that the life of a felon has been forfeited; for felonies at common law
were punishable with death. But where no felony has been committed
the reason of the rule does not apply, and it seems to us that the sacred-
ness of human life and the danger of abuse do not permit an extension
of the common law rule to cases of suspected felonies .... [Shooting by
an officer] is never allowed where the offense is only a misdemeanor,
and where there is only a suspicion of felony the officer is not warranted
in treating the fugitive as a felon. If he does this he does so at his peril,
fact. Jurisdictions following the first view hold that the officer is justified. Those
following the second protect the officer if a felony has in fact been committed,
although the suspect did not commit it. Petrie v. Cartwright, discussed in the
text, represents the third view-the felony must have been committed in fact
and by the person who is killed by the officer. Note, 38 Ky. L. J. 618 (1950),
citing cases representing each of the three views.
'114 Ky. 103, 70 S.W. 297 (1902).
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and is liable if it turns out that he is mistaken. He may lawfully arrest
upon a suspicion of felony but he is only warranted in using such force
in making the arrest as is allowable in other cases not felonious, unless
the offense was in fact a felony.5
A recent case taking the view that the person killed in effecting
the arrest must have committed a felony in fact is Commonwealth v.
Duerr6 In that case the police arrested a car thief who told them
of a supposed rendezvous with his accomplices. The police laid a trap
but caught the wrong men. These men fled and were killed. The
court held that no matter how reasonable the grounds of belief may
be, an officer making an arrest upon suspicion of a felony is not justi-
fied in killing the suspect unless a felony has in fact been committed.
Professor Waite, however, supports the view that the officer should
be protected although no felony has been committed in fact in an
article in the Michigan Law Review.7 He argues that if the officer
had reasonable ground to believe the fugitive guilty he should not
be liable for killing him because of the accepted common law rule
that reasonable mistake of facts negatives liability if the facts, had
they been as believed, would have negatived it.
It must be admitted that there is some argument for support of
the view that the officer should be protected in such cases. He is
making a lawful arrest upon reasonable belief. In such a case, it may
be argued, the arrestee should submit. If he is innocent, he will be
released. But, on the other hand, the arrestee may not know that
there is reasonable belief of his guilt. He only knows that he is in-
nocent. He also knows that if he is arrested he will have to suffer the
humiliation of the arrest and the confinement which will follow be-
fore his arraignment. If in fact innocent, he will desire to flee these
evils.
And the danger inherent in such a rule is shown in the Petrie
case,s supra, and in the case of Johnson v. Williams' Administrator.9
In that case the officers had a warrant for the arrest of Dave Browder
for murder. The officers, being informed that Browder was on his
way to see his father, waited at a road crossing for his arrival.
Moments later two men were seen approaching in a buggy leading a
gray horse. The officers had been informed that Browder was leading
a gray horse. They heard what they thought was the voice of Browder
in the buggy. It was dark. The officers claimed that they attempted
to halt the two men, but instead of halting they increased their speed,
-Id. at 109, 299.
6158 Pa. Super. 484, 45 Atl.2d 235 (1946).
7Waite, Some Inadequacies in the Law of Arrest, 29 Mich. L. Rev. 448,
462 et seq. (1931).
See the discussion of this case in the text, supra, at page 410.
111 Ky. 289, 63 S.W. 795 (1901).
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and in order to prevent what they thought was Browder's escape, the
officers fired and killed the deceased. It turned out that it was not
Browder in the buggy but two innocent young men. Undoubtedly,
the officers had a reasonable right to believe that Browder was in the
buggy but the facts do not support the reasonable suspicion found in
many of these cases. It is one thing to make an arrest under such
circumstances but an altogether different thing to kill to complete
the seizure of the suspected felon.
In the end the determination of the issue depends upon whether
it is reasonable to allow an officer to go so far as to take life to effect
an arrest upon reasonable suspicion of the commission of an atrocious
felony. The prevailing view-and the trend is also in that direction.-
is that it is unreasonable. Human life is so precious and so irreplace-
able that it is better that an occasional felon escape than that an
occasional inocent man be killed on suspicion, even though the
suspicion be a reasonable one.10 A private person making a valid
arrest in this type of case occupies an even weaker position. In the
first place the arrest is invalid." But, even if it were valid, and the
arrestee, although arrested on reasonable belief, did not in fact com-
mit the crime, there is less argument for protecting a private person
than an officer, who is, after all, acting in an official capacity.' 2
2. The Rule in the Case of Minor, Non-Atrocious Felonies.
Suppose that the arrestee has not committed a major or atrocious
felony but only a minor, non-atrocious one. May an officer go so far
as to take the arrestee's life if it reasonably appears that otherwise he
will escape arrest?
At a time when all felonies were punishable by death, all felonies
were, in effect, atrocious and major. At such a time it was not un-
natural that the killing of any felon was regarded as preferable to
his escape from arrest. But the severity of the criminal law has been
so far relaxed that the penalty for many of these old-time felonies is
no longer death. Particularly is this true as to non-violent property
felonies. In addition, legislatures have been busy creating new
felonies, many of them non-atrocious in character and non-violent in
fact and punishable merely by confinement in the penitentiary, fre-
quently for a relatively short period. Neverthless, it still remains the
"law in the books" in most jurisdictions that an officer can kill to
11 For companion notes taking contra views of the question, see Note, 38
Ky. L. J. 609 (1950), and Note, 38 Ky. L. J. 618 (1950). Mr. Ison, the author of
the first note, has a discussion of the situation in Kentucky, Note, 40 Ky. L. J.
192 (1951).
11 A private person cannot make a valid arrest in such a case unless a
felony was committed in fact. See A.L.I. Code Crim. Proc., Off. Dr. with Com.,
June 15, 1931, at pp. 239-240.
12 See Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 Ia. L. Rev. 201, 276 (1940).
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effect the arrest of one guilty of any felony, if necessary to effect his
arrest, 3 but it is not considered to be a good rule by many, there are
some cases vigorously opposed to it, and the trend is decidedly away
from it. 14
The American Law Institute Restatement of Torts has taken the
view that neither an officer nor a private person, with or without a
warrant, is privileged to use deadly force merely to stop the flight of
one whose arrest is sought for the commission of a non-dangerous
felony.'3 Rollin Perkins, decrying the lack of decision authority for
the suggested rule, is of the opinion that the prestige of the Restate-
ment of Torts will do much to further its acceptance on the criminal
side.'0
The suggestion for modification is not a new one. As long ago as
1887, Judge Brown, later appointed to the Supreme Court, made this
statement in a federal decision:
I doubt, however, whether this law would be strictly applicable at the
present day. Suppose, for example, a person were arrested for petit
larceny, which is a felony at the common law, might an officer under
any circumstances be justified in killing him? I think not. The punish-
ment is too disproportioned to the magnitude of the offense.17
Also, in Reneau v. State, McFarland, J., in holding a peace officer
guilty of manslaughter for shooting and killing a fleeing misde-
meanant suggested that the same rule should apply in the case of
lower grade felonies, saying:
And we may add that it may be a question worthy of consideration
whether the law ought not to be modified in respect to the lower grade
of felonies, especially in view of the large number of crimes of this char-
acter created by comparatively recent legislation, whether as to these
even escape would not be better than to take life.1s
Perhaps- the most persuasive and most vigorous argument for the
proposed rule was made by Professor Mikell in a debate at the annual
meeting of the Council of the American Law Institute in 1931 on a
proposed provision in the Model Code of Criminal Procedure to limit
an officer's right to kill to effect an arrest to cases where ". . . the
offense for which the arrest is being made or attempted is treason,
murder, voluntary manslaughter, mayhem, arson, robbery, common
' Orfield, Criminal Procedure From Arrest To Appeal 26 (1947).
"Bohlen and Schulman, Arrest With and Without Warrant, 75 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 485, 494 et seq. (1930).
"A.L.I. Rest. Torts sec. 131 (1934). Note especially illustration 1.
'
0 Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 Ia. L. Rev. 201, 275-276 (1940).
",United States v. Clark, 71 Fed. 710, 713 (1887).
112 Lea 720, 721 (Tenn. 1879). And see Bohlen and Schulman, Arrest With
and Without Warrant, 75 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 485, 494-504 (1927); Wilgus, Arrest
Without A Warrant, 22 Mich. L. Rev. 798, 812 (1924).
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law rape, kidnapping, burglary, or an assault with intent to murder,
rape, or rob." 19 Professor Mikell argued as follows:
It has been said, "Why should not this man be shot down, the man
who is running away with an automobile? Why not kill him if you cannot
arrest him?" We answer; because, assuming that the man is making no
resistance to the officer, he does not deserve death.... May I ask what
we are killing him for when he steals an automobile and runs off with
it? Are we killing him for stealing the automobile? If we catch him and
try him we throw every protection around him. We say he cannot be
tried until 12 men of the grand jury indict him, and then he cannot be
convicted until 12 men of the petit jury have proved him guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt, and then when we have done all that, what do we
do to him? Put him before a policeman and have a policeman shoot him?
Of course not. We give him three years in a penitentiary. It cannot be
that we allow the officer to kill him because he stole the automobile,
because the statute provides only three years in a penitentiary for that.
Is it then for fleeing? And again, I insist this is not a question of resist-
ance to the officer. Is it for fleeing that we kill him? Fleeing from arrest
is also a common law offense and is punishable by a light penalty, a
penalty much less than for stealing the automobile. If we are not killing
him for stealing the automobile and not killing him for fleeing, what are
we kililng him for?20
However, the proposed provision encountered so much opposi-
tion that it does not appear in the Official Draft of the Model Code
of Criminal Procedure.
Fortunately, there is positive case authority for the proposed modi-
fication in the common law rule in the case of private persons. The
leading case is State v. Bryant.21 A hog was stolen from the de-
fendant's employer and the defendant, suspecting one Cogdell, went
to his house and charged him with the offense but he ran. The de-
fendant, who was not an officer, shot him in order to prevent his
escape. The stolen hog was found in Cogdell's house. Cogdell did
not die from the wound and the defendant was indicted for an as-
sault and battery. In holding him guilty the court said:
It must be, however, that the powers of arresting, and the means used
must be enlarged or modified by the character of the felony. The im-
portance to society of having felons arrested in cases of capital felonies-
such as murder and rape-must be much greater than in cases of in-
ferior felonies, such as larceny.... Extreme measures, therefore, which
might be resorted to in capital felonies, would shock us if resorted to
in inferior felonies. 22
10 See 9 A.L.I. Proceedings 179 (1931). And see Warner, Modern Trends
in American Law of Arrest, 21 Conn. Bar Rev. 191, 206 (1943).
.
1 9 A.L.I. Proceedings 187 (1943).
2165 N.C. 327 (1871).
21 Id. at 328. "The stealing of a hog, a sheep, or a goat is, under our statute,
a felony, without regard to the pecuniary value of the animal. So would be the
larceny of a single ear of corn, which is 'a part of any outstanding crop.' It
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The rule that a private person cannot go so far as to take the life
of one who has committed a minor, non-atrocious felony even though
it appears reasonably necessary to do so to prevent his escape was
enunciated again in the recent case of Commonwealth v. Emmons, 23
commented upon in the Annual Survey of American Law.24 The
defendant, a woman, had defaulted in her conditional sale payments
to a finance company and agents of the company came to repossess
her automobile. They were unable to arouse her when they went to
the house; she claimed that she was sleeping. They pushed the car
and she, thinking they were stealing it, fired at them, shattering a
bone in the leg of one of the men. She was convicted of aggravated
assault and battery. There is some doubt that the men were com-
mitting a minor felony or even any crime in this case and the de-
cision may in fact be one where the facts support a situation no
stronger than a reasonable suspicion of a felony, where there was
no felony in fact. At any rate the court uttered strong language in
support of the rule that a private person cannot kill to prevent the
escape of a minor felon. The court said:
While it has been asserted that some rule of law exists which justifies
killing in order to prevent the commission of a felony we are convinced
that no such broadly stated rule exists. There is no right to kill to prevent
any felony. To justify the killing it must be to prevent the commission
of a felony which is either an atrocious crime or one attempted to be
committed by force (or surprise) such as murder, arson, burglary, rape,
kidnapping, sodomy, or the like.25
It may be concluded that there is considerable secondary authority
and occasional vigorous dicta in decisions that an officer cannot kill
to prevent the escape of one who has committed a non-atrocious,
minor felony only. Further the rule is supported by the Restatement
of Torts. The situation is a stronger one in the case of private persons.
There is positive case authority to the effect that they cannot take
the life of a minor felon in order to prevent his escape. In the case of
both the officer and the private person the trend is strongly against
taking the life of a minor felon under such circumtsances.
3. Suggested Exceptions to the Minor, Non-Atrocious Felony Doctrine.
Suppose a farmer hears a noise in his henhouse at three o'clock
in the morning. Standing in the doorway of his home, he fires a shot
into the air and sees a man run out of the henhouse door. It is dark
would be shocking to the good order of government to have it proclaimed, with
the sanction of the courts, that one may, in the broad daylight, commit a
wilful homicide in order to prevent the larceny of an ear of corn." Somerville,
J., in Storey v. State, 71 Ala. 329, 341 (1882).
23 157 Pa. Super. 495, 43 Atl.2d 568 (1945).
"Annual Survey of Amer. Law 1148-1149 (1945).
2r 43 Atl.2d at 569.
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and he is unable to recognize the thief; he sees only a form. He shoots
to kill or at least wound so grievously that the man may be caught.
Stealing is a statutory felony. The thief is killed. Is the farmer guilty
of a crime?
This supposititious case raises the problem of killing one who is
committing a non-atrocious felony in the nighttime in order to pre-
vent his escape. There are a number of cases which suggest an ex-
ception to the non-atrocious felony rule in this type of situation, say-
ing that a private person should be able to take the life of a minor
felon under such circumstances to prevent his escape. A fortiori an
officer would have the same right. This is because the minor felon
has committed his act in the nighttime; if he escapes he will evade
punishment for his crime, because it is impossible to ascertain his
identity.
A leading case suggesting this "exception" to the minor felony doc-
trine is Storey v. State.203 In that case the defendant, a private per-
son, was indicted for murder. There was some evidence that he had
been in pursuit of the deceased for the purpose of recapturing a
horse, which the deceased had either stolen, acquired by fraud, or
else unlawfully converted to his own use. The court held that the
deceased's offense could not be greater than larceny in the daytime, a
state statutory felony, and so the defendant had no right to take his
life since the felony was non-atrocious and non-violent. The court
said, however, by way of dictum, that some cases suggest that an
exception should exist in the case of non-atrocious felonies com-
mitted at night, giving the owner of property the right to shoot the
absconding felon, since if he escaped he would evade punishment,
his identity being covered by the darkness.
Blackstone points out that both the Roman and Athenian laws
made it lawful to kill a thief if he were caught in the act of theft at
night.2 7 And Texas has a statute making a killing justifiable when
property is being stolen at night or while the thief is within gunshot
of the scene of the theft,28 provided the offense is a felony.29
And yet, courts have not taken kindly to the suggested exception.
Practically all states hold that a private person is not justified in
killing one who is caught in the commission of a minor, non-violent
felony, even though it be at night3 This is as it should be. While
one feels a great deal of sympathy for the owner of property who
"71 Ala. 329 (1882).
4 Blackstone, Comm. (Sharswood ed. 1900) star-page 181.2'Tex. Penal Code art. 1222 (Vernon, 1936).
" See Teague v. State, 84 Tex. Cr. R. 169, 206 S.W. 193 (1918), and McKinney
v. State, 96 Tex. Cr. R. 342, 257 S.W. 258 (1924).
11 See Note, 22 Ky. L. J. 450 (1934). But see State v. Metcalfe, 203 Ia. 155,
212 N.W. 382 (1927).
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apprehends a thief who is stealing it in the nighttime and who cannot
learn either the thief's identity or disable him so that he may be
identified, the fact remains that it is the policy of the law to consider
human life of more value than property.3 1 The same reasoning should
apply in the case of an officer.
There is a second reason for a repudiation of the suggested ex-
ception-it is pregnant with unintended tragedy. Sometimes the
person who is shot is guilty of no crime whatever-he is a neighbor
who has stopped in the henhouse or the barn to get out of the rain.
And, while generally those who commit such nighttime thefts and
other minor felonies are indolent colored men or shiftless poor-white-
trash, occasionally a neighbor's boy is shot robbing a water-melon
patch, an offense which may be a statutory felony, if committed in the
nighttime. It is one thing to kill a friendless ne'er do well, quite
another to take the life of a neighbor's son. And, there is always
that possibility, if one shoots at a fleeing form in the nightime.32
A related, suggested exception to the rule that one cannot take
the life of one guilty of a minor, non-atrocious felony in order to ap-
prehend him is found in cases involving the setting of spring guns.
There are those who argue that one should be permitted to set spring
guns to apprehend thieves and like depredators. However, although
there are some early decisions which seem to hold that life may be
" Simpson v. State, 59 Ala. 1 (1887). See Moreland, Law of Homicide 267
(1952). In Commonwealth V. Beverly, 237 Ky. 35, 34 S.W.2d 941 (1931), noted
in 22 Ky. L. J. 450 (1934), the defendant suspected deceased of being about to
steal his chickens. He secreted himself near his henhouse and watched deceased
and another enter it and begin to take chickens. He then shot into the hen-
house. The deceased was killed. The appellate court held that under such facts
defendant would be guilty of at least manslaughter, although the offense was
a felony.
" There is a student's note, Note, Defense of Property, 25 Mich. L. Rev.
57 (1926), which takes a distinctly contra view to that presented in the above
text. The note concludes:
"From the layman's point of view, it seems that a necessary killing
or serious bodily injury enacted in prevention of an irreparable loss of
property is justifiable as a matter of course. The lack of cases on the
exact point, considered in the light of the frequent newspaper accounts
of homicides under similar circumstances, might be construed as justify-
ing the conclusion that the 'right' of the question is so incontrovertibly
settled as not to even raise the question of a criminal charge against the
person acting in prevention of the threatened crime."
What the student says, above, is literally true-but he has failed to grasp the
larger aspects of the problem. There are few cases on the question; this is
because most persons killed under such circumstances occupy an inferior place
in the community-and the killers are usually properous property owners. The
writer knows of a number of such cases; in none of them did the property
owner stand trial. And yet, when these cases do actually go to trial and on to
the appellate courts, the decision is usually in favor of the protection of human
life over property. The note writer has the attitude of the property owner
toward the problem, not the attitude of the law.
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taken in certain instances by spring guns set to defend property,s3
modern authority is strongly opposed to this view.34 When a law
breaker is killed or badly maimed by such a device, the injury is out
of all proportion to the crime.35
In Commonwealth v. Beckham,36 the defendant, owner of a small
chili stand, placed a gun inside the building in such a position that
it would fire when a window was raised from outside. The deceased,
a "drifter," apparently tried to get into the building and was shot.
It appeared from the evidence that the defendant had merely in-
tended to frighten intruders away and not to kill them. Nevertheless,
the jury found him guilty of criminal negligence in placing "so
dangerous an agency" in so perilous a position.
In addition to the fact that set guns are highly dangerous agencies
capable of inflicting serious injuries or death upon those whom they
are set to catch, it must be kept in mind that they constitute a menace
to everyone who may, by chance, come in contact with them. Children,
visitors, even officers of the law upon their official business are all
possible victims.
In Pierce v. Commonwealth,37 the accused, keeper of a small store,
had been troubled by burglars for several years. He set a spring gun,
aimed so as to fire into the body of any person who opened the door
from outside. One night he failed to lock the door. A policeman upon
his official duties tried the door, found it unlocked, pushed it open,
and was killed. The appellate court. held that a conviction of murder
in the second degree would have been affirmed if there had not been
error upon another point.
The right to use a set gun even in the protection of life is limited.
One may justify a killing by such a device when he, himself, would
have been justified in taking life. Thus, a defendant could justifiably
take life by a set gun in order to prevent an atrocious and violent
felony.38 This is really not a limitation, one could use a pistol and
shoot to kill or maim under like circumstances.
"United States v. Gilliam, 1 Hayw. & H. 109, Fed. Cas. No. 15,205a (1882)(in a dwelling house or in the curtilage surounding it); State v. Moore, 31
Conn. 479 (1863) (dictum); Gray v. Combs, 7 J. J. Marsh. 478 (Ky. 1832).
" State v. Green, 118 S.C. 279, 110 S.E. 145 (1921); State v. Barr, 11 Wash.
481, 39 Pac. 1080 (1895); annotations, 19 A.L.R. 1437; 28 A.L.R. 873; 37 A.L.R.
1101.
' Simpson v. State, 59 Ala. 1 (1877).
'306 Mo. 566, 267 S.W. 817 (1924).
31135 Va. 635, 115 S.E. 686 (1923).
"State v. Marfaudille, 48 Wash. 117, 92 Pac. 939 (1907); State v. Barr, 11
Wash. 481, 39 Pac. 1080 (1895).
THE USE OF FORCE IN EFFECTING OR RESISTING ARREST 419
4. Where the Arrestee is Committing, Has Committed or is About to Commit
a Misdemeanor.
At common law, neither an officer nor a private person can arrest
without a warrant for a misdemeanor which is not committed in his
presence and, in general, neither can arrest for one committed in his
presence unless it involves a breach of the peace.3 9 An officer can,
of course, arrest with a warrant for any misdemeanor.
Assume that an officer or a private person is making a valid arrest
for a misdemeanor under the above rules. How far can he go in the
use of force to effect the arrest? Of course, the amount of force that
can be used depends upon the resistance offered to the arrest.40 But
suppose the resistance or flight of the arrestee reaches the point where
he will escape unless he is killed or wounded enough to bring him
under subjection. Resistance or flight will never justify a dangerous
wound or the taking of life to effect an arrest where the offense is
only a misdemeanor. And this is true whether the resistance or
flight occurs before or after arrest.41 As has been said in one combina-
tion of words or another by many judges: "It is more in consonance
with modern notions regarding the sanctity of human life that the
offender escape than that his life be taken, in a case where the ex-
treme penalty would be a trifling fine or a few days imprisonment."4 2
A. Axrester's Right lo Self-Defense
However, a different situation is presented where the misde-
meanant's resistance becomes such as to raise the right of self-defense
in the officer or private person who is attempting a valid arrest.
Whatever the grade of the offense, felony or misdemeanor, neither an
officer nor a private person loses his fundamental right to self-
defense where he is attempting a valid arrest.4 3 And even if the
arrest is illegal but the arrestee not only resists but becomes the
aggressor, the arrester will be entitled to what is called "imperfect
self-defense," if he finds it necessary to protect himself from death
or serious bodily injury. In such a case of "imperfect self-defense"
the arrester will be guilty of manslaughter only, his fault in bringing
on the encounter by an illegal arrest preventing him from pleading
"perfect self-defense." "
There are some cases that state that the doctrine of self-defense
has no application in cases where a homicide occurs in effecting an ar-
See A.L.I. Code Crim. Proc. Com. p. 231 et seq. (Dr. June 15, 1930).
,
0 Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 Mich L. Rev. 798, 814 (1924).
41 Idem., citing cases at fn. 727.
'2 Idem.
"
3 Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 Ia. L. Rev. 201, 283 (1940).
"Moreland, The Law of Homicide 87 (1952). See Carter v. State, 30 Tex.
App. 551, 17 S.W. 1102 (1891). And see Wilkerson v. State, 143 Miss. 324, 108
So. 711 (1926), dissenting opinion.
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rest.4 , It is argued that the officer or private person, where mak-
ing a valid arrest, has the right to effect the arrest and to do so must
needs become the aggressor. Even if this were literally true, the rule
should be limited to arrests for atrocious felonies since in the case
of lesser offenses the arrester should never take the life of the ar-
restee in effecting an arrest. As a matter of fact the statement is not
true even in the case of atrocious felonies, since in all arrests, from
those involving atrocious felonies to the lowest grade misdemeanors,
46
the arrester never loses his right to self-defense, if the arrest is
valid and he has not exceeded the force that he should use in effecting
it, considering the circumstances.
B. Use of Force in Resisting Azresi
1. Where the Arrest is Lawful
There is no right to resist a lawful arrest made in a lawful man-
ner.4 7 If the resistance is intentional and an intentional killing of the
arrester occurs the offense is murder.48 The fact that the arrestee is
mistaken as to either the law or the facts as to the legality of the
arrest will not avail him. It is the policy of the law to protect one
who is executing lawful process in a lawful manner and consequently
it is considered unwise to protect one who is resisting such process,
even though his resistance is supported by a reasonable belief that
the service is illegal.
Where there is resistance to a lawful arrest, lawfully executed,
but the killing is something less than intentional, the rule is more
difficult to state. Dickey, in an excellent article in the Cornell Law
Quarterly,49 states that the great majority of courts and text writers
have assumed that the resistance in and of itself, per se, constitutes
the malice requisite for murder. But Dickey points out that the cases
do not support such a proposition for all of them, without exception,
contain facts other than the resistance sufficient in and of themselves
to support a murder conviction. For example, the killing will be
with a deadly weapon, in the commission of a felony, or in some other
manner which constitutes inferred or implied malice' under accepted
common law principles. Thus, in a Kentucky case where the de-
fendant in resisting a lawful arrest killed the officer "with a deadly
bowie knife," the court in affirming a murder conviction said:
The law did not require that they should have been told that the
killing must have been malicious. The officer is the minister of the law;
" Birt v. State, 156 Ala. 29, 46 So. 858 (1908).
" See Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 Ia. L. Rev. 201, 284 (1940).
,
17 Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 Mich. L. Rev. 798, 817 (1924).
"Dickey, Culpable Homicides in Resisting Arrest, 18 Cornell L. Q. 373
(1933).
" Idem.
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he represents its majesty; his person is therefore clothed with a peculiar
sanctity. An assault upon him, when properly engaged in the execution
of his duty, is an assault upon the law, and if he is stricken down at such
a time ... by one knowing him to be an officer, it is murder, although
the doer may not have any particular malice. (4 Blackstone, page 201;
1 East, page 303.)50
The use of the bowie knife, a deadly weapon, was sufficient in it-
self to support a conviction of murder grounded upon inferred malice
in this case. The remarks of the court to the effect that the resistance
to the arrest constituted the required malice, while not technically
dictum, may be said to be superfluous.
At any rate there are at least two modern cases which hold that
an unintended homicide resulting from resistance to lawful arrest
is not necessarily murder. The first, an English decision is Regina v.
Porter,51 decided in 1873. The defendant was legally arrested on a
criminal charge. He refused to enter the cart which was to take him
to jail and the officer called on the deceased, a bystander, to assist.
During the scuffle which ensued, the prisoner kicked the deceased in
the abdomen from which injury he died three days later. The court
instructed the jury that if the accused kicked the deceased intending
to inflict grievous bodily harm and death ensued, it was murder; or
if he inflicted the kick in resistance to lawful arrest, even though he
did not intend to inflict grievous bodily harm, it was equally murder;
but if, within the course of the struggle, he kicked him unintention-
ally, then he was only guilty of manslaughter. The jury returned a
verdict of manslaughter. The chief value of the decision lies in the
obvious attempt of the judge to make a manslaughter verdict possible.
While the second part of the instruction may be interpreted to give
effect to the rule under discussion, the third part gives an opportunity
to the jury to evade it. It is clear that the facts of the case call for
a conviction of murder, if the rule were applied as ordinarily stated.
It is by such a judge, with such instructions, with such a jury, that
obsolete law is sloughed off.
A more distinct repudiation of the rule occurs in State v. Weiseng-
off,52 a West Virginia decision. The defendant had been indicted for
unlawfully selling liquor and had given bond but the bond was for-
feited and the sheriff had been instructed to bring him in. The officer
stepped on the running board of the defendant's car for the purpose of
arresting him in order to carry out these instructions. They were near
the state line and Weisengoff attempted to get across a bridge into a
neighboring jurisdiction and so escape the lawful arrest. In this at-
" Dilger v. Commonwealth, 88 Ky. 550, 561 (1889).
51Regina v. Porter, 12 Cox C. C. 444 (1873).
2 State v. Weisengoff, 85 W.Va. 271, 101 S.E. 450 (1919).
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tempt the officer was killed by being crushed against the side of the
structure.
It is altogether possible that Weisengoff's act was sufficiently
dangerous to constitute murder; it might even be argued that the
death or serious bodily harm of the officer was "substantially cer-
tain," 53 but the case was not tried on either of these theories but on
the supposition that, if the officer's death resulted from resistance to
the lawful arrest, the offense was murder. Weisengoff was convicted
of murder and appealed. The appellate court reversed the conviction
and, facing the issue squarely, said:
We have examined a great many cases of homicide of officers, com-
mitted while making lawful arrests, but have been unable to find any
case holding that, where the death resulted from the prisoner's efforts to
escape, and not in the doing of some particular act inherently dangerous,
or designedly committed for the purpose of inflicting bodily injury, the
accused is guilty of murder .... Malice... cannot be inferred from the
mere effort to escape arrest.54
These two decisions constitute the only judicial expression op-
posed to the supposed historic doctrine that an unintentional homi-
cide resulting from resisting arrest is necessarily murder but modem
legal writers are uniformly opposed to it,55 some going so far as to
say that it is at last recognized as nonexistent. 6 Equal opposition
is found among writers in England.57 "This is as it should be. The
test for determining whether a defendant, who has committed a non-
intentional homicide is guilty of murder is, in this instance as in a
case where one has inadvertently killed while committing a felony,
not the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the act which caused the death
but the amount of danger in it. If the act in itself was so wantonly
dangerous and barbarous as to constitute the kind and degree of
negligent conduct requisite for murder, then he is guilty of murder,
otherwise not." 1s
2. Resisting Unlawful Arrest.
A private person has the right to resist an unlawful arrest.59 He
can repel force with force. It does not have to be pat-a-cake force,
11 See the discussion, Moreland, The Law of Homicide 18 (1952).
5' State v. Weisengoff, 85 W.Va. 271, 101 S.E., 450, 456 (1919).
' The leading article on the subject is Dickey, Culpable Homicides in Re-
sisting Arrest, 18 Cornell L. Q. 373, 376-379 (1933).
16 "The ancient doctrine that a murder conviction could be founded upon
a death in the course of a felony, or occasioned by resistance to lawful arrest,
is being limited. The former now requires a felony dangerous to life, and the
latter, supported for centuries on dicta, is at last recognized as non-existent.
'Constructive crime' is no longer favored." Hall, The Substantive Law of Crimes
-1887-1936, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 616, 642 (1937).
17 For citations, see Moreland, The Law of Homicide 58 (1952).
"I1d. at 58-59.19Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 Mich. L. Rev. 798, 817 (1924).
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the one making the illegal arrest is in the wrong and may be repelled.
In the end, the arrestee may take the life of the arrester in such a
case if it becomes necessary to do so in self-defense. °
But suppose the arrestee in a case of illegal arrest kills the arrester
not in self-defense but in anger or to avoid the arrest? Such a situa-
tion raises a difficult problem as to the guilt of the arrestee. Funda-
mentally, in such a case the well known common law principle that an
illegal arrest may raise heat of passion sufficient to reduce an in-
tentional killing to voluntary manslaughter comes into play.0 1
The common law recognizes several provocations as sufficient to
raise heat of passion in a reasonable man, making him likely to so
lose control over himself, as to kill the provoker. One of such pro-
vocations is illegal arrest. 2 The law does not condone homicide under
such circumstances; it is not the theory of the law that one should
kill in anger at, or to avoid, an illegal arrest. Rather, it is the posi-
tion of the law that even reasonable men, while they should not kill
under such circumstances, often are so filled with heat of passion be-
cause of the frailty of human nature63 that they do kill. When a
defendant fails to measure up to the standard of a reasonable man
when emotionally stirred up by a legal provocation and kills, the law,
as a sort of compromise, holds him guilty of voluntary manslaughter
rather than of murder or of excusable homicide. 4
Apparently, the rule operated automatically in favor of the one
illegally arrested in the time of Hale. 5 If the arrest was illegal and
a killing occurred the offense was manslaughter, except in the case
00 Orfield, Criminal Procedure From Arrest To Appeal 27 (1947).
61 It should be pointed out that there is a line of cases taking the view that
hot blood aroused by an illegal arrest will not reduce a killing from murder
to manslaughter. Dickey, Homicides In Resisting Arrest, 18 Cornell L. Q. 373,
386 (1933); Note, 31 Ky. L. J. 359, 360 (1943). The position of these courts is
well expressed in a Kentucky case, Alsop v. Commonwealth, 4 Ky. L. Rep.
547, 552 (1883):
"When a known officer of the law, armed with a warrant, though
defective, emanating from official authority, whether the charge it con-
tains be true or false, makes known his purpose, and in good faith
attempts to execute it, it is the duty of the person about to be arrested
to submit to his authority, when exercised in a proper manner."
Fortunately, it is believed, the great majority of jurisdictions hold other-
wise. The law should be lawfully enforced. It is ironic for these courts to talk
about the majesty of the law when it is being violated. It is true that the
position of the officer must be considered in such cases, often he operates at a
-disadvantage. Consequently, for his protection the law distinguishes between
patent and latent defects. But there are limits in the extent to which the law
can go in protecting him, even when he is acting in good faith. So, he should be
cautious and make every effort not to make an illegal arrest. When he does so,
he becomes a law-violator and his rights must be balanced with those of the
arrestee, who is being illegally arrested.
'Moreland, The Law of Homicide 77 (1952).
83State v. Ferguson, 2 Hill (S.C.) 619, 622, 20 S.C. 619 (1835).
See the discussion, Moreland, The Law of Homicide 67 (1952).
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of express malice. That is to say that it was unnecessary for the
defendant, subjectively, to actually be filled with heat of passion be-
cause of the illegal arrest in order to gain the benefit of the rule.
The present rule in England is not clear on the point 6 but some
American courts have definitely gone so far as to hold specifically
that the illegality of the arrest will necessarily reduce the offense to
manslaughter, '7 except in the case of express malice.68 Cases adopting
this view base their reasoning, fundamentally, not upon the doctrine
of provocation but upon a social policy of protecting the liberty of
the individual citizen against unlawful enforcement of the law.6 9 One
must not make light of such a fundamentally sound public policy or
belittle the importance of preserving inviolate the love of liberty in
each and every heart and the willingness to defend it with all vigor
against any encroachment, no matter from what source it may come.
On the other hand even the most ardent lover of individual liberty
would find it difficult to maintain the position that one should kill
to prevent an illegal arrest. Most illegal arrests arise out of ex-
pediency,70 bad judgment, lack of precise knowledge of the law
on the part of the person making the arrest, or the heat generated
by the circumstances of the particular case. In spite of the humilia-
tion and anger aroused in the breast of the one illegally arrested by
the unlawful affront to his person, his respect for human life and
his common sense should prevent him from killing the trespasser to
his person in the absence of some element of self-defense.
But suppose that he does kill him? The law in the interest of pro-
tecting the person of the individual from unlawful arrest might
excuse him. On the other hand since he has acted in an unreasonable
manner in going so far as to kill the individual who is attempting the
illegal arrest, it might hold him guilty of murder. The law does
neither. Weighing the interests involved, the law, ordinarily, strikes
a position of compromise and concludes that the arrestee should be
guilty of manslaughter. The penalty is still so severe that others will
hesitate to kill to prevent an illegal arrest. And, since the officer
knows that the mantle of protection is not thrown completely around
1 Hale, Pleas of the Crown (ed. of 1778) 457-465.
0
"Moreland, The Law of Homicide 78 (1952).
17 Commonwealth v. Carey, 66 Mass. (12 Cush.) 246 (1853); Commonwealth
v. Drew, 4 Mass. 391 (1808); Jones v. State, 170 Mass. 581, 155 So. 430 (1934);
Dickey, Culpable Homicides in, Resisting Arrest, 18 Cornell L. Q. 373, 379-382
(1933).
1 State v. Scheele, 57 Conn. 307, 18 Ati. 256 (1889); Roberson v. State, 43
Fla. 156, 29 So. 535 (1901); People v. White, 333 Ill. 512, 165 N.E. 168 (1929);
Rafferty v. People, 72 Ill. 37 (1837); State v. Holcomb, 86 Mo. 371 (1885);
Galvin v. State, 46 Tenn. (6 Cold.) 283 (1869).
" See People v. Scalisi, 324 Ill. 131, 154 N.E. 715 (1926).
" As to this factor, see the excellent article by Hall, Law of Arrest in Rela-
tion to Social Problems, 3 U. Chi. L. Rev. 345 (1936).
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him either if the arrest should prove to be illegal, he too will proceed
with caution, or, at least, be forwarned of the possible consequences
if he fails to do so.
It would seem, then, that the rule that an individual who protects
his personal liberty from the affront of an illegal arrest by killing his
assailant is guilty of manslaughter is an expression of wise social
policy. The question remains, however, whether the rule should
operate automatically. There is considerable argument that, since
the rule is a judicial compromise, it should do so. On the other hand
there are at least two valid arguments against an automatic opera-
tion of the rule.
First, if the rule operates automatically, it will sometimes work in
favor of one who was not in fact incensed by the illegality of the ar-
rest. For example, the arrest may have been illegal because of some
technical defect unknown to the defendant. That means, that so far
as his knowledge went, the arrest was legal. In such a case the real
incentive for the killing was something other than the illegality of
the arrest. To permit a defendant who has committed a homicide
to seize upon the rule under such circumstances as a means of re-
ducing the offense to manslaughter involves going further in the pro-
tection of personal liberty than is socially expedient, it is believed.
Second, if the rule operates automatically, it creates a variance in
the law. The rule in the provocation cases is that the defendant must
have been filled with heat of passion at the time of the homicide in
order to obtain the benefit of the rule. If, in the cases of illegal ar-
rest the reduction were based upon an objective social policy for
the protection of personal liberty, those who administer the law
would be continually harassed by being forced to attempt to explain
and rationalize this variance. When a judge went through this process
a few times he would be apt to conclude that the subjective test
would be preferable in all cases.
It is concluded that the rule in thd majority of jurisdictions that
the reduction of the offense to manslaughter does not operate auto-
matically but that the defendant must in fact, subjectively, have
been filled with heat of passion in order to claim its benefits is pre-
ferable.
Before concluding, it .will be helpful to inquire whether the di-
vision of defects in warrants into those which are patent and latent,
which is of value in determining the liability of the arrester where
he has killed the arrestee in executing a defective warrant, is of
value in determining the liability of the arrestee where he has killed
the arrester in resisting arrest on a defective instrument. It is submit-
ted that the division is not of value in the latter group of cases. As
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pointed out in a note in the Kentucky Law Journal,'1 the proper
test for determining whether the arrestee should have his offense re-
duced to manslaughter in such a case is whether he was in fact
aroused to heat of passion by the illegality of the arrest, not whether
the defect was patent or latent. He may never have seen the warrant
and so did not know whether the defect was one or the other. He
may have seen it and the defect was latent but he had other informa-
tion that the arrest was illegal. The courts have occasionally seized
upon the classification to reduce the offense where the defect was
patent, considering that the officer in such a case had acted without
authority and that consequently the arrest was illegal. Conversely,
where the defect was latent, the courts have often seized upon that
fact as a ground for refusing to reduce the offense to manslaughter
upon the ground that the officer should be protected under such cir-
cumstances.7 2 The distinction is not supported by reason, it is be-
lieved. It is difficult to understand, for example, how heat of passion
could be aroused by a warrant void on its face but not seen by the
defendant any more than by a warrant which had a latent defect,
but was not seen. The proper degree of the crime would be more
certain of determination if the type of defect were not permitted
to control the case, the test being grounded solely upon whether the
defendant, subjectively, was filled with heat of passion by the
illegality of the arrest.
" Note, 34 Ky. L. T. 73, 74, et seq. (1945).
7Idem.
